#WTH A Trump Iran Deal?

The Art of Preemptive Capitulation

New York Times

😍 Let’s start with Superman Steve Witkoff, the man who can negotiate anything. Here he is talking Iran nukes on April 11, 2025, to the WSJ: “I think our position begins with dismantlement of your program. That is our position today,” Witkoff said, summing up his message to Iranian officials. “That doesn’t mean, by the way, that at the margin we’re not going to find other ways to find compromise between the two countries.” “Where our red line will be, there can’t be weaponization of your nuclear capability,” Witkoff added.

😕 Witkoff, three days later, and a little smarter, to Fox: “The president means what he says, which is: Iran cannot have a bomb,” Witkoff told Fox News in a Monday interview. Iran “do[es] not need to enrich past 3.67%. In some circumstances, they’re at 60%, in other circumstances 20%. That cannot be,” he said. “You do not need to run — as they claim — a civil nuclear program where you’re enriching past 3.67%.” Witkoff says the next round of talks with Iran will focus on “verification on the enrichment program and then ultimately verification on weaponization.” “That includes missiles — the type of missiles that they have stockpiled there. And it includes the trigger for a bomb,” he adds. “We’re here to see if we can solve this situation diplomatically and with dialogue. The first meeting was positive, constructive, compelling,” Witkoff says.

😔 Well, not so “compelling” that Witkoff wasn’t forced to move the goalposts once again, a day later on X: “A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal. Any final arrangement must set a framework for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Middle East -- meaning that Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program. It is imperative for the world that we create a tough, fair deal that will endure, and that is what President Trump has asked me to do.”

Now, when you’re negotiating peace in Ukraine, peace in Gaza, and peace in Iran, details can get a little fuzzy, so let’s cut Witkoff a little slack. After all, as the New York Times made clear this week, his boss may not want Iran to enrich uranium beyond 3.67 percent, but he doesn’t want to help bomb Iran back to the Stone Age either.

So, what does Trump want?

Our pod guest this week, the inimitable Elliott Abrams, had a handy cheat sheet from the White House archives to tell us what Trump wanted back in the heady days of 2018. Here’s a screenshot of the header:

But let’s not stop there! We can agree the JCPOA was a terrible deal, per Elliott, “And [Trump] said it enriched the Iranian regime. Also agree. They didn't come clean about their previous nuclear weapons activity. Also agree. The JCPOA failed to deal with the threat of Iran's missile program. Also agree. So what was the Trump position? We need a deal in which they must never have an ICBM. Cease developing any nuclear capable missiles, stop proliferating ballistic missiles to others. Cease its support for terrorists extremists, and regional proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Taliban, al-Qaeda. End its publicly declared quest to destroy Israel, stop its threats to freedom of navigation, cease escalating the Yemen conflict, end its cyber attacks against the United States, stop its grievous human rights abuses and stop its unjust detention of foreigners, including US citizens. That's a wonderful list.

So, what does Trump 2.0 want? Any of those things? Or just, following from what Witkoff has been burbling, JCPOA 2.0? If the aim is to limit Iranian enrichment, the JCPOA did that. If the aim is to bribe Iran for that gift with reduced sanctions, the JCPOA did that too. If the aim is to weaken Iran’s support for terrorism, the Israel Defense Forces did that, but Iran’s weakness won’t last forever.

It seems clear that Witkoff’s opening play with the Iranians last week got him slapped down by the White House. A principals meeting had him re-re-correcting his stance about Iran being permitted enrichment. But Super Steve and his Iranian pals are meeting again this weekend, and it’s anyone’s guess what’s going to happen. Will Witkoff walk back his “that is our position today” attitude — like he was selling a high-rise in Soho — and shut the door on Iran’s ability to have its own enriched uranium supply? Or is that just a bargaining feint?

If the White House line is the bottom line, it’s unclear what the Iranians or Witkoff are going to be discussing. There’s not a chance in hell that the Islamic Republic is going to give up its enrichment… or, indeed, any other part of its nuclear weapons program. It could make small concessions that appear to an inexpert audience like progress, but as with the original Iran deal, Tehran intends to keep its ability to break out at a time of its choice.

Remember, Iran’s nuclear weapons program is a backstop — sure, it’s about pushing plans for regional hegemony; but it’s more important as an insurance policy to protect the regime from external aggressors. Would the Israelis have raised an attack on Iran with Donald Trump if the ayatollahs were already producing nuclear weapons? Would Muammar Qaddafi still be Libya’s dictator if he hadn’t given up his own weapons program? How about Ukraine? Would it be contending with Vladimir Putin’s war if Kyiv hadn’t relinquished its nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War?

Now maybe — just maybe — we, the American public, are being played by DJT. Maybe he wants to be sure he’s given diplomacy a chance before he joins with the Israelis in a strike on Iran. Maybe that’s why he has moved another carrier battle group into the region. Maybe that’s why there are now B-2 bombers at Diego Garcia. Maybe.

More likely — and I’ll be delighted to eat crow if I’m wrong— the ongoing battle between the Ronald Reagan wing of MAGAland and the Charles Lindbergh wing is causing the President to hedge his bets. We can be sure that had JD Vance been veep in Trump 1.0, there would have been a strong argument against Trump taking infamous Islamic Revolutionary Guard leader Qassem Soleimani out (as, indeed, Vance argued against striking the Houthis).

Here’s what will potentially keep the talks going: October is the last moment that the deadly “snapback” clause of the Obama JCPOA can be exercised. That’s the provision that “snaps” back into place all the United Nations sanctions that were lifted by Obama and friends. It’s a magical panic button, and doesn’t allow China or Russia to use their UN Security Council vetoes to prevent the reimposition of sanctions. The United States can’t trigger snapback since Trump pulled out of the Iran Deal, but word on the street is that France and the UK are ready to pull the trigger.

How deliciously ironic it would be if the man who proudly ripped Obama’s Iran Deal to shreds would be the one to protect Tehran from its most effective failsafe provision. And all Iran needs to do is keep Superman Steve at the table for long enough to preclude snapback… A concession here, a concession there, and poof, there goes the whole shooting match.

For Iran, the game is time: time to build back its proxy network, time to build back its economy, time to get out from the JCPOA’s provisions, and time to recover from the ruin that Hamas wrought on October 7. The question is, is Donald Trump going to give them that time? Or is he going to be the man who ordered the strike on Qassem Soleimani?

HIGHLIGHTS

What do you make of the first round of U.S.-Iran negotiations?

EA: It seems to me that they won the first round, the Iranians. I've been trying to follow the statements that Witkoff is making, for that matter, the president's making, it's not easy to figure out what it is that they're saying and what it is that they're demanding.

Let me give you an example. Witkoff said on April 15th, the conversation with the Iranians will be much about two critical points. The first is verification of uranium enrichment and ultimately verification on weaponization. Nothing about dismantling. Not only had Waltz, the National Security Advisor, used the word dismantle. But Witkoff also April 15th said, "Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program." Period. Well, which is it? Is it dismantle? Is it verify? Is it eliminate? These are critical differences and I think my assumption is he is unaware of the importance of speaking carefully.

Is there anyone who understands Iran or nuclear issues accompanying Witkoff?

EA: I have the impression that he was alone. Well, he was accompanied in Oman by our ambassador to Oman, who is a respectable career foreign service officer, but not an expert on the Iran nuclear issue. So where's the expert? I think the answer is there is no expert. Same as when he went to see Putin, which he's now done twice. So I think he thinks he understands this fully. I used to work on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and every word you say is very carefully read and reread and reread in Ramallah, in of course, Jerusalem, in Tehran, in Cairo. Every word because each word means something different. And his use of language like verification versus eliminate suggests he doesn't quite understand that these are two different concepts with two very, very different meanings. Here's what strikes me, and it gets back to what you were just saying, Dany, we know what the Trump position is supposed to be because he took it in 2018 in his first term.

What I'm looking at now is his fact sheet, the White House fact sheet of May 8th, 2018 that said, what does Trump want? He hates the JCPOA, quote, "The Iran deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into." I agree. And he said it enriched the Iranian regime. Also agree. They didn't come clean about their previous nuclear weapons activity. Also agree. The JCPOA failed to deal with the threat of Iran's missile program. Also agree. So what was the Trump position? We need a deal in which they must never have an ICBM. Cease developing any nuclear capable missiles, stop proliferating ballistic missiles to others. Cease its support for terrorists extremists, and regional proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Taliban, al-Qaeda. End its publicly declared quest to destroy Israel, stop its threats to freedom of navigation, cease escalating the Yemen conflict, end its cyber attacks against the United States, stop its grievous human rights abuses and stop its unjust detention of foreigners, including US citizens. That's a wonderful list.

It's Donald Trump's list. It was Donald Trump's position. The only difference between then and now is, well, there are two big differences, Iran's closer to a nuclear weapon and Iran is in every other way much weaker. So one would expect a more robust US policy, not a weaker one.

What role does the American military buildup in the region play in the negotiations?

EA: Let's acknowledge first that maybe we're all wrong. Something else is going on simultaneously, which is a striking American military buildup. The second carrier task force and the B-2s in Diego Garcia, that looks like preparation for a strike on Iran. There's an item in the newspapers recently that another big shipment of weaponry has gone or is on its way to Israel. So maybe this is all cover.

Now, I actually thought a couple of weeks ago when the second carrier group and the B-2s to Diego Garcia were announced that that really might be true. I think that much less now because of what we've seen and heard from Witkoff and in the negotiations. But there's a possibility there. If that's not true, if it is a form of negotiating where Trump says we are going to show them we really have military capability but has no intention of using it, and in fact the relevance of that capability is diminished by the way Witkoff is talking. If it's not true, if it's not meant to really corner the Iranians, to scare the Iranians, then what we have here is Trump trying very, very hard just to get a deal, almost any deal.

I've asked myself what might stop this and maybe the Iranians would stop it. That is the conditions they demand are so crazy that Trump says, "I'm not going to do that." The other thing that might stop it would be if I'm going to come back to what you were saying, Dany, about the JCPOA, I use the word derision. That is you know already what the Democrats are going to say because John Kerry said it in an op-ed article. I've forgotten whether it was the New York Times or the Washington Post, but Kerry said, "We need a deal with Iran that goes far beyond their nuclear program, that eliminates the missile program and the support for ..." John Kerry! So Trump will be derided for going for JCPOA 2.O, for Obama two. All the Democrats will do it and Republicans will have very few defenses. Now, maybe that has an impact because the one thing the president really doesn't like, it's being mocked or being derided.

Do the Israelis have the ability to stop Trump from going through with a bad deal?

EA: As to the Israelis, one of the reasons that Iran wants these talks is while they're underway, and obviously Iran is going to try to stretch them out and stretch them out, the president has said he won't let that happen.

But while they're underway, maybe two months, we ask the Europeans not to snap back the UN sanctions, and we ask the Israelis freeze, don't do anything. If a deal is reached, let's say in, I don't know, June, one of the things the Iranians are going to want out of it is no snapback. And they're also going to not want a situation, neither will Trump, where June 20th he signs a deal and June 21st Israel attacks Iran. So I think he would be making an effort to hold the Israelis back, and that worries me a lot. If he did nothing, they'd just make an independent decision. But if he makes a deal, I think it's very hard for them to publicly denounce the deal and say, "Well, the hell with you, we're doing it anyway."

How do you think the Trump administration should approach negotiations with Iran?

EA: I start with the view that Iran is in a weaker position now than it's been really since the Iran-Iraq war. Their proxy network has been largely dismantled by Israel. They've still got the Houthis, but the Houthi ability, for example, to project power to Israel is very, very limited. Their economy's in quite bad shape. There have been some news stories recently about advisors of the Ayatollah Khamenei saying to him, "We got to get a deal with the United States because we're under real pressure here and if they ever attacked us, no one really knows what the impact would be on the survival of the regime." So I think we start from a position of strength and they from weakness. I think our position should be first on the regional question, no more support for terrorist groups. It's got to stop. None. Now they'll cheat, but if that were part of the deal there would be a significant reduction, I think.

Same on the missile program. What Trump asked for in 2018, real limits on the missile program. And on the nuclear program, I think we should take a very kind of matter of fact position. No country has ever enriched to 60% and not gone on to build a nuclear weapon. That's got to be over. The enrichment that will be permitted, and I don't think we can reverse that 100% at this point and say no enrichment. But even Witkoff has said 3.67%, the amount you need for nuclear medicine or for nuclear power. And if you won't agree to that, that means by the way, shipping out all the highly enriched uranium and it means the destruction of a lot of centrifuges. If you won't agree to that, then the program will have to be destroyed.

At what point do we need to consider pursuing regime change in Iran?

EA: If you want a different Middle East, a peaceful Middle East, then you want to change in the conduct of the regime. And I think the message to the regime is, if you won't change your conduct in all of these ways, then you leave us no choice. Think about it twice and three times because in the aftermath of that kind of attack, what will happen to the future of the regime? I think they know they're at risk. So it's a matter asserting American strength and willpower.

Is there a debate within the administration about how to approach Iran?

EA: I think the debate within the administration, if there is a debate, will be between those who say, and here I would think someone like Vice President Vance would be such a person, "Don't do this." That is, don't attack Iran. "This is what you ran against. You're going to turn yourself into George W. Bush. You're going to get into another endless Middle Eastern war. This is everything you're against, don't do it." And on the other side will be people one assumes like Waltz and Rubio, maybe Hegseth who will say, "No, the analogy here is not Iraq. We're not sending 100,000 troops to Iran. We're not sending one. The analogy is to the Soleimani execution that you did, that took a day." Now this may not take a day. It may take several days, but it's not a war. People talk about the US War with Iran. It's not a war. It's a strike or a series of strikes.

How will our partners in the Gulf react to a deal with Iran that allows the Iranians to continue uranium enrichment?

EA: 10 years after the JCPOA, if President Trump makes a deal with Iran, which allows them to continue enriching, you will see the Saudis and Emiratis saying to us, the Saudis are already saying it, "Oka, you can't treat your friends worse than your enemies. We want to start enriching. Yes, safeguards we'll sign up, IAEA, you name it. But it's not possible that they can enrich and we can't." I think they've been waiting to see what the United States does about the Iranian nuclear weapons program. But if we make a deal now that allows it to live, you'll see the Emiratis and the Saudis saying, "We're not going to take a deal that's worse than that."

How do we fix this? Fire Witkoff?

EA: Prayer always first. Then firing Witkoff. You could pray for Witkoff too. What you need is a tough-minded, hard negotiator. Somebody like George Shultz, Jim Baker, who's capable of being a really tough negotiator. But again, we go back to the president, president's got to decide. If the president wants what he used to want in 2018, he may well be able to get it in a negotiation, but only by making it clear to the Iranians, if I don't get it in negotiation, I'm going to get it anyway. And I think that's what's not clear to them. As a tactic for those of us who are very worried about a poor negotiation and worried about a kind of JCPOA 2.0, I think we should be talking about it now.

Why didn’t President Bush bomb Iran’s nuclear program at the end of his second term?

EA: Well, first as to Bush, why didn't he do it? I think one reason was if you go back to the Syrian nuclear reactor bombing in 2007, which Bush didn't do and which the Israelis then did, the argument that some people made, Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of State Rice was, "Hey, you've already bombed two Muslim countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, and you can't keep on just bombing Muslim countries one after another."

But I always thought there was another argument, which was that Bush was confident that his successor, President John McCain, was a safe pair of hands. And if the bombing was needed under President McCain, it would happen. And then of course, though he was leading for a while, Obama won. Why didn't the Israelis bomb then when Bush didn't? I think they came very close in the summer of 2012. But they had Barack Obama totally against them, and John Kerry totally against them. And that made it very tough. I don't think there was a consensus in Israel about doing it. And there is now, it's different. So unless the United States prevents it, if we don't do it, I think they will.

Many believe that the Israelis have not bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities because they don’t have the capacity to take out the program. Do you think that’s right?

EA: I don't think that's right. I think they can do a lot. We've seen what they can do from the air, and of course now the air defenses, as you said, are pretty much gone. Secondly, I think there's likely to be, and I'm imagining this, that is I've not seen any secret papers, there's likely to be a ground component. The Israelis have done things on the ground in Iran that we can't do. These assassinations or the theft. Remember getting into this place where the Iranian nuclear files were and getting them out of Iran, it's unbelievable. So they have capabilities on the ground. So I'm clear, I think we all are, that the United States Air Force is a lot bigger, has bigger bombs and would do a larger, better job with fewer days of strikes. But the Israelis can do a lot of damage. And I really think now, as I talk to people left and right, military and civilian, now there is a consensus which there wasn't.

Why are so many on the fringe right claiming that Trump is being “goaded” into striking Iran by neocons?

EA: There aren't enough neocons to fill a phone booth these days, I think. Well, my speculation is that a big piece of this is plain old anti-Semitism. And what it is basically saying is the President doesn't want to do this, the Jews are making him do it. It seems to me disgusting and quite dangerous too. There's no recognition of the arguments. There's no debate over the arguments. Tucker has on people who will say what he wants them to say. And when you don't have any argument other than the neocons, and what does neocon mean to somebody like Tucker Carlson, it means Jew warmonger. That's what he means. And that's what he's really saying. As I said, I think it's pretty disgusting. And it's also quite an insult of Donald J. Trump that the President isn't sufficiently intelligent and strong-minded to make up his own mind. He's going to be led around, not by his hand-picked staff, not by his Secretary of State, his national security advisor, but by the neocon warmongers. Where are they in this administration?

Read the transcript here.

SHOWNOTES

Witkoff indicates US seeks to cap Iran uranium enrichment, not dismantle nuclear program altogether (Jacob Magid, Times of Israel, April 14, 2025)

Iran demands U.S. sanctions relief for nuclear program limits in talks (YNet News, April 13, 2025)

Iran Seeks Sanctions Relief for Nuclear Limits in Talks With U.S. (WSJ, April 12, 2025)

Scoop: Iran nuclear talks expected to continue Saturday in Rome (Barak Ravid, Axios, April 13, 2025)

U.S. and Iran see Saturday's nuclear talks as test of whether other side wants a deal (Barak Ravid, Axios, April 11, 2025)

Europeans sidelined in US-Iran nuclear talks despite holding key card (Reuters, April 10, 2025)

Lawmakers, national security experts skeptical of Trump’s Iran diplomacy (Jewish Insider, April 10, 2025)

Iran says it may halt cooperation with IAEA if US continues to threaten use of force (Times of Israel, April 10, 2025)

Are B-2 bombers a message to Iran? 'We'll let them decide,' Pentagon chief says (Reuters, April 9, 2025)

Report: US only told Netanyahu it was talking with Iran after he got to DC; Trump did not promise that deal would meet PM’s demands (Times of Israel, April 8, 2025)

B-2 Stealth Bombers Deployed To Diego Garcia Have Been Striking Targets In Yemen (The War Zone, April 4, 2025)

The Talks in Oman: Round One Goes to Iran (Elliott Abrams, CFR, April 13, 2025)

A Paradigm Shift for the Middle East (Elliott Abrams, Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2025)

Ex-envoy: Trump’s policy on Iran aimed at a deal, not regime change (Iran International, December 13, 2024)

Trump’s Iran Nuclear Deal Looks a Lot Like Obama’s (Eli Lake, The Free Press, April 14, 2025)

Why Iran’s Supreme Leader Came Around to Nuclear Talks With the U.S. (Farnaz Fassihi, New York Times, April 11, 2025)