Yesterday’s news, headlined by revelations of the murder of 40 babies at Kfar Aza — including actual beheadings — seared our souls. At home, the shock was driven deeper by the continued and enthusiastic support in elite academia for the monsters of Hamas. But, as in every terrible moment, there are gestures and signs that there are wonderful people in our world as well: The orthodox man who went to JFK and stood at the El Al desk as young people streamed in with their IDF call up papers and serially paid for ticket after ticket himself. 250 tickets. The man who went out in Sweden and bought 900 roses to pile in front of the Israeli Embassy. These are human beings.
Our podcast with Elliott Abrams will be out today, and a summary up tomorrow. But in the meantime, we have cribbed from our own Kori Schake’s internal email at AEI to link to some analytical work that may be of interest to you.
Hal Brands sketched the big picture, arguing that "the Pax Americana of the post-Cold War period is over. For a generation after 1991, the world saw historically low levels of geopolitical and ideological competition, mostly because Washington and its allies had such decisive advantages. That’s changing as revisionist actors — principally China, Russia and Iran — try to throw back American power and create their own spheres of influence."
Ken Pollack wrote two outstanding pieces, one comparing and contrasting Hamas' attack with the 1973 war, making this important point, among many: "Hamas and PIJ meant to undermine the deepening rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Everything about that courtship has signaled the waning of the Palestinian cause in the eyes of most Arab governments."
His other excellent article assesses Israel's military options, concluding "Because of the potential for high casualties, a major assault on Gaza would also be the most problematic for Israel’s rapprochement with the Arab states—which was undoubtedly one of the principal targets of the Hamas offensive, and of Iran’s support for that offensive. And finally, a major offensive that threatened Hamas’s military viability and its control of Gaza is also the most likely to provoke intervention by Iran and its other allies."
A h/t to Dany’s piece in FP, "Iran envisions a future of multifront, city-to-city fighting of the kind Israel has not seen since 1948. From Jerusalem, that plan may have looked like a fantasy in the face of a vastly superior Israeli force. And the fact that Salami seems incapable of operational security—laying out his vision for Israel’s defeat in explicit terms—should have meant that the country was well prepared for something like this weekend’s attack."
And the “blame Congress” crowd gets a smack down: "The Iranian leadership, which prides itself on both deep connections to certain Washington friends and trenchant analysis of American politics, has decided that Joe Biden’s top priority is his reelection, and therefore he must keep oil prices low and avoid confrontation at all costs. Certainly, part of Iran’s calculation in backing this war now was that Team Biden would not abandon the secret pact they struck with him to cool certain of Iran’s more troubling policies (killing/kidnapping Americans and enriching and stockpiling higher grade uranium) in exchange for relief from US sanctions."
The outstanding team at AEI’s Critical Threats Project looks at Iran’s own domestic crisis of legitimacy: "Iranian leaders have correctly diagnosed the root of the recent internal unrest as an increasingly insurmountable ideological rift between the regime and its population. Paradoxically, Khamenei’s soft-war efforts will more likely inflame anti-regime sentiments than inspire popular support for the regime."
And that pairs nicely with Nick Carl's piece assessing possible Hamas theories of victory: "The fact that Hamas launched its operation on the anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur War lends credence to the possibility that it expects support from others against Israel. One of the key features of that war was that Egypt’s surprise attack heralded a multi-front war."
Michael Rubin has several pieces out relating to the Hamas attack, making the important point that Palestinians as well as Israelis suffer from Hamas: "What many diplomats and human rights organizations have too longer ignored is that Israelis are not alone among victims of Hamas’ reign of terror; ordinary Palestinians suffer under their rule just as Sunni Muslims suffered every day under Islamic State control."
He also questions the U.S. carrier deployment (AEI’s John Ferrari takes the opposite view in his comments to Breaking Defense), and assesses that "Netanyahu bears ultimate responsibility for Israel’s failure, but the Biden team’s Iran strategy enabled an enemy never willing to divorce itself from an aggressive ideology that prioritizes the destruction of the Jewish state over bettering the lives of the Iranian people themselves."
Elisabeth Braw assesses the potential consequences for oil prices: "Ships that ordinarily travel through the Strait of Hormuz will, in fact, become the most tangible indicator of escalation involving Iran: if insurers consider such violence likely, shipowners will have to reroute their vessels to alternative—and much longer—journeys. That will cause disruption and price spikes in the oil market."
In addition to our publications, we have a couple of events planned:
tomorrow (Wednesday) at 2 pm, Katie Zimmerman, Nick Carl, and Brian Carter will host a twitter space on how Iran's regional goals fit into the war on Israel (no link yet, but you can join through AEI's twitter account).
this coming Monday from 12:30-1:30, Dany Pletka and Ken Pollack are hosting an in-person event on the war; further details to follow.
Alternative shipping routes that do not involve the straits of Hormuz? Take a look at the actual shipping maps: show me, one dot capable of not moving through the straits of Hormuz, leaving from Abu Dhabi or the united Arab emirates. https://www.vox.com/2016/4/25/11503152/shipping-routes-map