#WTH No, we're not losing in Iran... Yet.
No, again, the war with Iran is not lost. It could be, but it ain’t over yet. As usual, all is in the hands of President Donald Trump. And as usual, the most serious obstacles to victory are to be found in the choices Trump makes: People, planning, and purpose.
People
Beyond the machinations within the Trump administration (JD Vance, his cronies at DoD, their concerted leaking campaigns), once again, the President’s choice for key negotiator on some of the most critical national security threats of his term is costing him time, costing the United States taxpayer money, and risking defeat. Steve Witkoff, who may not be a terrible person, is nonetheless a terrible negotiator, immodest when modesty is imperative, ill-advised by his sole key adviser — himself, inexperienced on basic questions (the nature of the Iranian regime; the nature of Vladimir Putin), and a serial leaker, too often manipulating his audience against the President’s objectives. (And yes, Mr. Witkoff, journalists are dreadful gossips.)
Similarly, on the tangential, but critical question of Lebanon and Hezbollah, Donald Trump’s go-to guy, Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, gets almost everything wrong. He’s a big fan of Turkish strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He’s insufficiently critical of Syrian leader Ahmad al Sharaa. He’s confused about what matters in Lebanon. And like so many inside the Trump team, weirdly, he can’t stand Bibi Netanyahu, and he lets it affect his judgment. Ranting in favor of a ceasefire that allows Hezbollah to rebuild isn’t solving the Lebanon problem; it’s exacerbating it.
Meanwhile, it is not clear who chose Pakistan as the main interlocutor between the United States and Iran, but Pakistan (the country that hosted Bin Laden for years) is clearly on Team Iran. That’s an own goal by the Trump administration, and whether or not Pakistan was recommended by Saudi Arabia, the bottom line is that someone should have known better.
Then there are the folks at DoD. Generally speaking, I have the highest regard for our men and women in uniform, and somewhat less regard for the civilian leaders in this administration. Too many inside DoD are spending time propitiating the President and his whims, catering to their various cronies inside the White House, and otherwise not doing the necessary job of prosecuting the war, selling the war, and defending the war inside and outside the administration.
And then there’s the top guy himself. Unlike so many, I am deeply grateful to Donald Trump for making hard decisions. He deserves enormous credit for making the call on Iran in the first place. But his waffling is frustrating and counterproductive. Because there is no chain of command or process within the Trump administration, the President is buffeted by his mates and cronies, swinging wildly from one position to the next. Are we in a ceasefire or not? Is Hormuz important or is it not? The nukes must all go, or not? We support the Iranian people, or not? Iranian sponsorship of terrorism matters, or doesn’t? Hezbollah must be eliminated, or not? Kharg? UAE and Saudi security? Regime change? Unconditional surrender?
In every instance in the list above, the President has taken one and the other position, often sequentially. It’s exhausting for those of us watching; imagine being in the Gulf, or being in the military, or, honestly, being in Iran… I get that the President likes to keep his enemies on their toes. But our allies are also whiplashed from side to side.
Planning
There’s too much loose and uninformed talk going around Washington DC about a failure to plan the campaign in Iran. Most of it is hogwash. The Pentagon has been planning for an all out war in Iran for at least two decades. That, after all, is their job. And contrary to the far left media narrative, Hormuz wasn’t a surprise. There was a plan. But we are a democracy, and that plan needs to be approved by the Commander in Chief. See above.
Similarly, we have neither run out of nor are we going to run out of interceptors. Yes, we have a serious problem with ammo, and yes, we should have solved it long ago, and yes this is a wake up call for a war with China. But no, Iran isn’t about to have control of the air, or much else, anytime soon. Note that the “interceptor stockpile” narrative that was on the front pages has now disappeared.
Indeed, the bottom line about America and Israel’s progress in the war against Iran is that the country and much of its leadership have been devastated. As one of my favorite Substack authors, John Spencer, writes, survival and victory are two different things. Here’s an snip from his excellent analysis:
The scale of military destruction alone is extraordinary. Much of the senior leadership structure that spent decades constructing Iran’s regional military network is dead. Senior IRGC commanders, missile force leaders, intelligence officials, nuclear scientists, operational planners, and even the Supreme Leader himself have been eliminated. Mohammad Bagheri, Hossein Salami, and other senior figures who represented the institutional backbone of Iran’s military strategy are gone. Entire command relationships were shattered during the opening phases of the war, leaving surviving leaders scrambling to maintain continuity while under constant pressure.
The damage extends far beyond personnel losses. Nuclear facilities that represented decades of investment and strategic ambition now sit buried under rubble after sustained strikes on enrichment sites, underground complexes, centrifuge production facilities, research centers, and supporting infrastructure. Analysts continue to speak as though Iran can simply restart enrichment at industrial scale in a matter of months. That misunderstands what was destroyed. Advanced centrifuge production depends on precision manufacturing, specialized tooling, secure facilities, trained personnel, supply chains, and protected infrastructure. Large portions of that ecosystem no longer exist.
Planning-wise, if the aim was to weaken Iran and its proxies across the board, that has happened. There is no sector in which Iran is prevailing, and its clear that the regime is beset by internal fighting that is handicapping decision-making and leadership. Slips in the timeline have been driven by mixed messaging from Trump and the inevitable realities of the gap between planning and combat.
But planning is not simply military strategy and tactics. Planning is informed by the intentions behind the war. And thus, planning cannot be distinguished from the other problem endemic in the Trump administration:
Purpose
It remains unclear what the President of the United States wants from this war. And that endgame is critical to our military war-planning, and the planning for an end to the war. Similarly, the President appears to have few plans about how to keep the American public on side about the conflict. Sure, we can ride the economic storm, which is far less significant than most newspapers of record would have you believe — the last time gas prices were “this high” was, er, 2022, when prices topped $5 a gallon; we can also manage the bickering among allies; the fracturing political alliances, such as they are, and more. What will be harder to manage is an outcome that looks little like the one Trump advertised.
If we don’t get the nuclear “dust”, don’t permanently stop uranium enrichment, don’t get limits on missiles, don’t actually “change” the regime, don’t end up with Iran yielding back control of Hormuz, and don’t end up with much at all — something that seemed highly possible last week — then it won’t just be Donald Trump who sacrifices his credibility. It will be the United States of America.
In short, it would be good if we had a clear and public plan. A speech would be nice. Apart from anything else, a clear and decisive speech from the President would give him a roadmap to set his own expectations, a clear set of bones on which his administration could hang its policies, and our adversaries and allies alike a sense of what the future may bring.
I have written that should the war with Iran end with the transformation of the regime, the end of the regime, or, at the very least, a clear plan to remove Iran’s nuclear weapons materiel and manufacturing, limit the range of its missiles, and eliminate its support for its terrorist proxies, Donald Trump could count himself as one of the most transformational and consequential presidents in decades.
But the reverse is also true. If the President simply loses interest, decides it’s too hard, settles for a JCPOA-style deal with Iran, or otherwise punts on what he has suggested are his essential goals, then Iran, Russia, China (our enemies), and Israel, the Gulf, Europe, and non-Chinese Asia will be persuaded that the United States is indeed a paper tiger. Remember that Trump himself told us that had he been president in 2022, Putin would not have invaded Ukraine. That is believable, but should Iran end poorly, Trump risks being a Biden all over again.
If our adversaries become satisfied that America’s president no longer has the appetite to manage the security of the global commons in times of crisis, Ukraine may well be the least of our problems. Putin could eye the Baltics. China will take Taiwan. Europe will be at risk, as will South Korea, Japan and beyond. The domino effect was real in the Cold War, and Trump signaling weakness could start the pieces falling once again.
Much depends on Trump’s decisions in the coming weeks. He has the guts and the vision to carry victory through. He also has the capriciousness and the ADD to screw it up royally. It would be good if someone he listens to could help him see that America’s role in the world and his place in history hang in the balance.
Consider the options: Send in troops for what would certainly be an unpopular ground war? Or “Plan B,” blockade the Strait for a few months and squeeze Iran’s economy, oil storage capacity, and eventually oil production. If we’re lucky, despair overcomes fear (per another commenter) and the Iranian people step up. Maybe some Gulf states continue to take a few whacks of their own. I’m as impatient as the next person, but given those choices, I’d let time work its magic for me.
The downside is that Republicans will likely take it on the chin in November. But is that enough to deter Trump? Maybe. But he had to know that risk when this started, so my bet is that he stays the course and puts the screws to Iran/the IRGC until they pop - continues to do what has been needed for a long time. I remain optimistic. With markets hitting record highs, I don’t think I’m the only optimist.
It appears we lost momentum. But the truth is we remain in control with our magazines restocked. A blockade takes time. We see the ducks calmly passing (Witkoff) and miss the paddling under the surface (the air, surface, and submerged assets at the ready to stop shipping in or out of Iran). For those who need fireworks to see progress, the U.S. can take out the Persian Gulf Star Refinery in Bandar Abbas at any time, removing most of Iran’s gasoline supply. Of course, human catastrophe might follow as food distribution would suffer. So, maybe let the blockade continue to slowly strangle the regime and ignore their annoying efforts to appear strong in the face of reality.
Some want to equate Iran’s survival to victory for the IRGC, and see its pestering behavior as evidence. In a strange way its continued existence is deemed strategic success. By any serious measure whether it is military capability, economic recovery, political cohesion, or strategic influence, Iran (the IRGC & Mullahs) is substantially weaker today than before the war began.
Much of Iran’s senior IRGC leadership, missile commanders, intelligence officials, nuclear scientists, and operational planners—including Mohammad Bagheri and Hossein Salami—have been eliminated. Entire command structures were shattered. Nuclear facilities, enrichment sites, underground complexes, and centrifuge production infrastructure lie in rubble; restarting industrial-scale production will be extremely difficult. Ballistic missile output, once estimated at 100 per month, has collapsed after strikes on tooling centers, fuel plants, assembly facilities, and storage depots. The blockade and Xi meeting will affect any restart as China provide key ingredients for missile fuel.
Naval forces, air defenses, and the aging air force have been devastated, allowing repeated U.S. and Israeli operations over Iranian territory. Threats to the Strait of Hormuz—called an “economic nuclear weapon” by Secretary of State Marco Rubio—have backfired, accelerating Gulf states’ efforts to bypass it and pushing regional governments closer to Israel.
Economically, losses run in the $400-500 billion range whether it is damage to steel plants, lost oil exports, sanctions, and industrial disruption. Visible leadership contradictions (with different leaders making completely different statements) and internet blackouts signal growing internal strain. No one can figure out what the rial is worth.
Iran’s proxy network, a key part of its strategy to counter Israel and the US, has been gutted. Hamas’s military infrastructure is largely destroyed. Hezbollah lost commanders, stockpiles, and supply lines after Assad’s fall; the Houthis and Iraqi militias confront attrition and isolation.
Damaged powers can still lash out. But by every meaningful metric of national power, Iran is far weaker. Its deterrence is damaged, its ambitions rolled back. Survival is not victory.
We must never forget, when fighting a theocratic, authoritarian, fascist regime (see Japan), you can completely obliterate large swaths of their power before reality forces their hand or the people exert control. Many cannot understand why the latter has not happened, …, but for an insurrection to take hold requires despair to overrule fear. That may come. But either way the IRGC will realize at some point its growing impotence and discover it faces an internal risk that is greater than the external enemy. And this friction, aggravated by the blockade will force their hand. The question is timing.
Right now, the biggest concern for the White House is $4.00+ gasoline and the fall elections. Keeping the blockade remains the best option to bring down or gut the regime. But the President’s hand may succumb to politcal pressure. Which explains why he told a reporter he does not think about gasoline prices much. He is signaling his center of gravity can hold longer than the IRGC’s. And thus we see both sides use the clock to win. One delays. And one seeks some semblance of a deal as the US becomes the world’s largest exporter of energy and it's economy keeps rolling along. My money is on the U.S.