#WTH On Sinwar, and the challenge that remains

A year in, this war is not done

This is the Siman Tov family. All were murdered on Yahya Sinwar’s orders on October 7.

There’s no one that likes the sight of a dead terrorist more than I. Seeing a murderer with his brains blown out — a little gory — is the kind of cosmic justice decent people can celebrate. So yes, it’s a great day when Yahya Sinwar, the architect of October 7 and the leader of Hamas dies at the hands of an Israeli soldier. Pause, savor the moment, and allow me to add a few notes.

• Sinwar was a bad man, and he will not be missed. But Hamas has not been killed, because the people who believe in Hamas’ mission, whether in Iran or in Gaza or at Columbia and Harvard have not been persuaded that they have lost.

• America is always persuaded that there is a guy — that guy we like, we can “work with,” who “gets it,” and will solve our problems. We are always wrong. “Guys” don’t solve problems. Institutions, systems, values, and practices solve problems.

• Accordingly, killing the “guy” is a great moment, but despite the killing of Osama bin Laden and his many successors — great work — we have not killed al Qaeda. Why? Because it still has potent adherents on the march through the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and beyond.

• Joe Biden and Kamala Harris celebrated Sinwar’s elimination, as they did Hassan Nasrallah’s. But they did everything they could to stand in the way of Israel’s ability to kill these enemies of America and Israel. Sinwar was killed in Rafah, which the Biden Administration insisted was a no go zone for the IDF. So yes, great he’s dead, but no thanks to Team Biden/Harris.

• The United Nations (as of this writing, silent on their pal Sinwar’s death) has not yet answered for its facilitation of Hamas and Hezbollah, nor for its employees (UNWRA) who work for Hamas, nor for its peacekeepers who cannot see Hezbollah’s violations of UN Security Council resolutions. The Biden Administration continues to insist that funding these terror enablers is in the best interests of American taxpayers. Without UN reform, we are subsidizing Iran.

• Until Israel crushes the threat from Hezbollah, there can be no chance for peace. So, no, Amos, Jake, Phil, and all the other boys who like to pass messages to the Israelis about their best interests from Joe and Kamala. Actually, Hezbollah needs to be subordinated to a real state of Lebanon or the fight doesn’t end.

• Then, the necessary Israeli response to Iran still hangs out there. Doubtless, the likes of Jake Sullivan will be telling the Jews that with Sinwar’s death, it’s time to declare victory and go back to making gefilte fish. That’s wrong. Iran must be dealt with, and Biden and Harris’s insistence that Iran not be harmed in any of its most vulnerable sites — nuclear, energy, military — is little more than a request to allow the mullahs another shot at Israel, on a later, and more propitious date.

• Bring. Them. Home. There are Americans being held in Gaza. There are more than 100 hostages still in the hands of Sinwar’s people. There can be no cease fire that leaves their plight unresolved.

There’s lots more here. Listen to our fantastic discussion on the anniversary of October 7th, here, or highlights below. Listen to people who understand how to deal with the military, strategic, and political threats talk about how we must deal with our enemies. Consider the continuing challenge of what a State of Palestine might mean, and what it will take to get there. Thanks for reading and listening. We’d love to hear what you think, too.

HIGHLIGHTS

Is Israel’s war in Gaza a sustainable operation? Do they have the resources to continue operating there much longer?

DD: My short answer to your question is, yes, they can. With respect to Gaza, one of the biggest things that struck me in traveling the entire length of the Philadelphi Corridor and watching the engineering units uncover an average of two tunnels a day as they move from the med over to the border of Gaza and of Israel as well as Egypt, is that if they’re going to stay anywhere in Gaza, it needs to be along that Gaza-Egyptian border. Because basically, and it comes down to something as simple as this, that is the venue through which Hamas has been able to acquire its weapons. So whatever future unfolds, it makes absolute logical sense for the IDF to stay there and monitor that border to assure that Hamas has no other access to weapons. Which ultimately will get them to the point where they will not have the capacity to conduct any sort of operation on the order of what happened 10/7 of last year. Again, there are all kinds of complications and additions here, but fundamentally, I think that’s what Israeli Defense Force and the leadership of Israel has to draw a line on, is their ability to control that border.

How should Israel continue to manage long-term threats from Gaza and the West Bank?

EH: The IDF, over the years, or the Israel establishment over the years in general, have devised various sorts of solutions to compensate for the fact that we have a relatively small military compared to the length of borders that we need to defend and the number of adversaries that we need to fight against. And I’ll get to the Philadelphi issue just in a second. But just to understand how complicated it is, the eastern border of Israel with Jordan, just on the West Bank area, is more than 10 times longer than that of the Rafah crossing in Philadelphi. And there is IDF presence there all the time. And the amount of weaponry that is smuggled into the West Bank, Iranian funded and shipped into the West Bank throughout the years, but specifically in the last six months or so since the Iranians really ramped up what they’re doing in Jordan in general and in the West Bank, is immense. And this is before we talked about the border with Lebanon and Radwan capabilities there.

Is there going to be a fundamental rethinking of Israel’s long-term security strategy after the failures on October 7?

EH: This system that the IDF has built, or what evolved of it over the years, completely failed our civilians in October 7th, to say the least. The IDF was not there to protect the civilians on the barrier, and Hamas was able to penetrate extensively into more than 30 of our communities, and butcher more than 1,200 over people. While doing that, they did not come through underground tunnels. They only came overtly over the fence that we build above. The reason for that is that over a period of time, Israel has managed to build a very robust subterranean barrier that people not talking about, because people always talk about the failures, not necessarily about the things that have succeeded. And that subterranean barrier that goes as deep as 100 feet as necessary is about three or four feet wide of concrete, reinforced concrete, with sensors, has been able to prevent Hamas from digging tunnels underground into Israel. And the reason I’m saying that is because, of course, cutting out the lifeline of Hamas for future replenishment is the most important thing, other than dismantling Hamas at the end of this war. And the vulnerability point is the barrier, or this piece of border between Gaza and Sinai. When the senior IDF officials are saying that there are other solutions, what they mean is that given a proper barrier underground, a robust official Rafah crossing that needs to be rebuilt because most of the weaponry that Hamas got over the years was actually smuggled overtly above ground, in tunnels, in trucks, through the Rafah crossing, because the Egyptians weren’t monitoring it carefully. There was no screening equipment. The IDF did not have access to it. The Americans didn’t really care. And Israel unfortunately overlooked many of that.

Is there a more imminent security threat in Gaza or the West Bank?

EH: We’re all focused on Gaza because, of course, Hamas were able to do this horrific thing on October 7. But I’m very worried about what’s happening with arms smuggling into the West Bank. And we cannot resolve this just by these kind of tools, because it’s a very long border, and the IDF will need to operate there very much.

How close are we to a post-war plan in Gaza?

EA: Last fall, soon after October 7th, weeks after, I helped organize a project on the day after. This one happened to be Vandenberg Coalition and JINSA, but there are a number of others. And we wanted to move very quickly. We went to Israel at the end of October for the first visit, we went back later. Why did we move so quickly? Because it was obvious that you needed to come up with a solution for the day after quickly, because the day after would come reasonably quickly. Well, now it’s a year later. And there is no day after. I mean, the war continues. I’ve read, I think, or at least skimmed, most of the proposals, and nobody really has a practical answer. I mean, looking at it today and asking, well, who’s . . . Okay, you need a government in Gaza. You need security in Gaza. Who’s going to do that? And everybody said last year, well, obviously you don’t want it to be Israel. You don’t want it to be Hamas. Palestinian Authority is not able to do it. I think on this subject, we are no further advanced than we were on October 8th, which is very unfortunate, because we’re going to need an answer, unless the IDF stays there semi permanently.

There have been large disagreements playing out between Biden and Netanyahu about a post-war Gaza in public, is it more effective to have those discussions behind closed doors? And what role should Egypt play in a post-war Gaza?

EH: I think that was more effective than doing it on the outside. But there were disagreements nonetheless. Okay. I think the question to Egypt should reside here, just as much as it would be in Israel. When just a few weeks ago, we all read that the US has approved the new aid package to Egypt, and also they actually increased it and released funds that were previously frozen because of human rights issues. Now all of it has been approved. You know, one would ask, what did the US get in return, and specifically in the context of ending the war and putting pressure on Hamas? I hope someone has an answer to that.

What about Qatar?

EH: And I would ask the same question about Qatar when a few months ago, there was an agreement or an announcement to renew the base in Doha for a decade, while the US is saying that there is significant assistance by the Qataris to release the hostages, including seven of which are Americans, four of them alive.

There are also large disagreements between Israel and the Biden admin about how to respond to Iran’s missile barrage. How do those public arguments affect deterrence?

DD: Look, deterrence is part of what we’re talking about. To deter adversaries from accomplishing actions that are not in our best interest, what you try to do is induce uncertainty in their minds as to whether what they are planning on doing will succeed or not. Well, to do that, you don’t tell your adversaries what it is you’re planning on doing. So we have a situation where you got the President of the United States publicly stating US preference for Israel don’t attack to lessen their nuclear development capabilities. And then the next day comes out and says, “No, by the way, don’t touch the oil production facilities.” And then the next day comes out and says, “Don’t mess with oil storage.” Okay, let me step back just a second. If you have those perspectives, great. But how about picking up a secure phone and discussing them in private? Because all it’s doing is revealing weakness to the rest of the world in the context of what the US position is. I’m of the camp that, just like you said, Dany, hey, Hezbollah has never been weaker. One could imply that that is the case in the context of the Iranian mullahs as well. And if there was ever a time . . . I mean, back to your point, you know, the obvious one in this room. Iran just launched over 180 ballistic missiles against Israel. Why would you not take advantage of that and respond in a manner which is indicative of the seriousness of what just happened?

What role should the U.S. play in any retaliation against Iran?

DD: Folks have said, well, to really dismantle their nuclear capability, we need the assistance of the United States. United States is not ready at this time. Well, I don’t know when they would be ready if not now, because you need to plan for these kinds of opportunities when they arrive. So I get it, but that’s not a reason not to respond in a fashion to degrade Iran’s ability, which they are in a rapid track to be able to finish their development of nuclear weapons. And just imagine if they put one of those on the top of the next 180 ballistic missiles that they launch.

EA: I think the target list is short in the sense that Israel could try to hit some of the nuclear sites. It could hit the oil industry, oil facilities. It could hit military targets, political targets, decapitation. Now, which of those is best? There’s a variable here, which is, what can Israel do? And I don’t know the answer to that question. If you had asked me whether they could do in two weeks what they did in two weeks in Lebanon, I’d have said, “No, that’s unrealistic.” So I don’t know what Israel can do with respect to the nuclear program. It’s a target, putting aside what President Biden said, that I think Israeli leaders should think about because this may be a good opportunity, and it may be one of the last opportunities to set back that program a long time. But again, the variable, how much can Israel do? I’m struck by the oil target. It’s true that it would help Putin in a way, if you assume that oil prices would double or more. It would hurt Xi Jinping for sure. It would have an impact on our economy, though not necessarily in the short time before the election. Things have to work. Prices have to work through. And we do have a strategic petroleum reserve, though it’s depleted. So, the reason I think about that target is, if you could deprive the regime of significant amounts of oil income, the way, frankly, we were doing with sanctions in the Trump administration, you’re not hurting the regime on one day, you’re hurting the regime for a very long period of time. And that weakens it. And it reduces the amount of money they have to give to Hezbollah and other proxies. And it maybe makes the Iranian people even angrier at their regime and what the regime has done to the country. Because I think they’ll blame the regime much more than they would blame Israel. So I don’t have a view as to what Israel should do, but I would actually kind of say what JD Vance did in the great debate, which is, when Israel makes that decision, we should support it.

What is Israel capable of achieving if it chooses to strike Iran again directly?

EH: As for Israeli capabilities, I think Israel can do a lot more than people think. I will say that the fact that our Air Force has been very, very busy in other issues over the last year doesn’t make it a clear cut to decide to do something like that. It’s more difficult than to bomb Hodeida port because in such complicated Air Force operations, as the general will know, the distance is the least problematic part, right? The pilots just need to stay awake. What’s really difficult is when they engage. And engaging Iran is more difficult than engaging the Houthis over Hodeida.

How is the politicization of American support for Israel affecting Israeli decision-making when it comes to retaliation against Iran?

EH: The fact that Israel is increasingly becoming a partisan issue in Washington is not good for the long term, for Israel’s security. And whatever we do in a single night in Iran or a week, there’s going to be not only a day after, but a year after, and a decade after. And for Israel, regardless of what we may think about the position of a single administration at this point, to do something so dramatic without coordination with an administration, that will have strategic implications on the day after.

Is Israeli leadership putting too much weight on the Biden administration’s opinion?

EH: Whether I like it or not, we are still a small country in the Middle East. And the United States of America is the only strategic ally that Israel has. The fact that I believe that this should have been an opportunity for the United States of America to do something about the Iranian nuclear program, or put this aside. I think definitely for Israel to do something so bluntly, opposing to a message of a President. You know, the President can say don’t to Iran, and they will do whatever they want. But for Israel to do that, it’s way more difficult. And I definitely don’t want to be recommending something like that. So where does that leave us? I think what we should do in the context of where we’re at is to increase our options in the future. And that would mean, in the context of what we’re talking right now, to significantly degrade Iranian defensive capabilities that are complicating our ability to attack Iran in the first place.

What did Israeli retaliation for Iran’s April missile barrage achieve?

EH: It was clear that Israel can penetrate Iranian airspace whenever we want, on whatever target, while they cannot do this significantly to us. But did we degrade Iranian capabilities while we’re doing that back in April 18th, I think it was? No. Should have we? I think so.

So, I think that’s the kind of spectrum of opportunities as we should look at them. And doing something like this will also enable us in the near future to rethink some of the other options once at least some of the temporal considerations have changed.

How worried are you about rising tensions in the West Bank?

EH: I’m very worried about what’s happening there. I’m very worried about the Iranian involvement there. I’m very worried that, because Elliott, you’re right, the PA has so far been very effective because it’s for their interest, not because they’re playing on our side in this regard, but to push down against the extremists. And maybe they can’t hold much longer, given the amount of money, drugs, arms, and training that Iran is pushing into the West Bank. And we need to focus for that. And we need to focus on Iran itself.

How key is eliminating Yahya Sinwar to ending the war in Gaza?

EH: I think eliminating Sinwar is a good vehicle to change the prospect of Gaza, as we’ve spoken before. And we mentioned Egypt and Qatar here already. Sinwar is not alone. He has two lifelines. A financial lifeline, even if it doesn’t give him dividends right now, but he knows in the future that whenever he wants to replenish, there is only one actor that can supply those funds, and that’s the Qataris, backed by Iranian money. and the physical lifeline coming from Egypt. When Sinwar asked himself this morning, how am I doing with those two lifelines? I would assume that he answered to myself, well, I’m pretty good. I mean, the Qataris haven’t signaled that they are done with me, and the Egyptians definitely didn’t signal that they’re done with me. So I’m good. I can still fight. And I think we need to work on that. And I think we need to work on that collectively, Israel and the US. And I will say, as it comes to Gaza, that even if this doesn’t work, and he wants to continue to fight, we can maintain a current situation in Gaza, because at the moment, there is not a real war in Gaza. There haven’t been a lot of rockets. I mean, there were today because Sinwar wanted to remind everyone that it’s a year for October 7, but over the last month or so, there have been very few rockets fired from Gaza to Israel, because he doesn’t have that many.

And we can maintain this kind of arrangement. It’s very different than continuing to push militarily on it. And to increase the conditions to get this deal done with the hostages. There is a linkage between a deal in Gaza and a deal in Lebanon as well.

You mentioned earlier that the Biden administration’s public statements are hurting deterrence against Iran, is it also encouraging Iran to act?

DD: This is what takes me back to my original comments with respect to deterrence. Your adversary is not going to be deterred if you don’t take actions with respect to answering the question. If the President of the United States says don’t, and Iran does, what’s your response? If it’s nothing, then all you’re doing is encouraging them to continue to act.

We talk a lot about Iranian capabilities, how strong is their air force?

DD: Piece of cake. Put me in, coach. I’ll just leave it at that.

What vulnerabilities did Iran’s missile barrages expose about U.S. national security?

DD: We just saw what, 180 plus ballistic missiles launched against Israel this last round, 120 or 30 in April. Okay, what happens if a adversary happens to launch that number of ballistic missiles against the United States? What do we have to defend ourselves with? Forty ground based interceptors. That’s the reality. And, oh, by the way, we’re going to replace them with an advanced version, and we’re going to buy 31 of those. How are we doing? We’ve got to address the fact that missile defense is a real subject that ought to be entertained with respect to the needs of America’s security. And I haven’t even raised the issue of regional defense of our forward operating locations, which are critical across all the services in a variety of different locations around the world. And I’ll just throw in there that the United States military is half or less than half the strength that it had when we fought Saddam in 1991. Now, do you think the panoply of threats against the United States is less than or greater than those posed by Saddam in 1991. Yet strong national security is not even a talking point in the top 10 talking points of either of the presidential candidates today.

Many Western military officials have traveled to Israel and come away with the same conclusion: Israel is doing all it can to prevent civilian harm. How come political leaders are still accusing Israel of genocide?

DD: Well, a combination of three reasons. One, intentional disinformation. Two, ignorance. And three, antisemitism.

What should the Palestinian Authority’s role be in post-war Gaza and what does the future of the PA look like?

EA: Every opinion poll, every opinion poll that’s been taken in the last decade has the same result. From Palestinians, we want Abbas out. These people are thieves. We have no confidence in them. So the question in the West Bank is almost the question of Gaza, which is, how do you build a governing structure that is competent, that is decent? Let’s put aside the word democratic for the moment, that people have confidence in because the people in it are trying to do well for . . . trying to do good for the people of the country, of the entity, whatever you want to call it. The last time somebody tried that, it was Salam Fayyad, and in the election, he got 2 or 3 percent of the vote. So you’re almost in a situation where you want a trusteeship. That’s not going to happen. So again, I think the best we can do is start thinking about, what could we and others, maybe, EU, maybe the Arab States do, to help put together a competent governing structure of the finite variety that would make life better in the West Bank, that would have a government that is not a government of thieves, and that would be trying to help the people of the West Bank and trying to help the economy there. We did it once. The we here is the United States government, and we did it by shoving it down the throats of the people leading Fatah. And that may be the only way to do it.

EH: By the way, this was done twice. I completely agree with everything Elliott said on this or on everything he said in general. The US has done that twice. The first time they’ve done it is shoving Abu Mazen in the throat of Arafat, and placing him as a prime minister. And then they did again, when they shoved Salam Fayyad in the throat of Abu Mazen as a prime minister. The only thing I’ll add is that there was an opportunity for that earlier in the year, but because of a policy of deescalation at all costs, what the administration chose to do is to endorse the person that Abu Mazen installed as a prime minister, Mohammad Mustafa. And they did this while all the pragmatic Arab countries around told them not to do it. The Emiratis said, we can work with him. He’s a money launderer. The Saudis said, don’t do this because we can’t work with him. And yet again, this is what state recommended and the White House approved. So sometimes you have opportunities, but what you want is to de escalate at all costs, you cannot sustain the heat of opportunities.

Read the transcript here.

SHOWNOTES

A year of war: IDF data shows 728 troops killed, over 26,000 rockets fired at Israel (Times of Israel, October 7, 2024)

US to give Israel 'compensation' if it hits acceptable targets in Iran – report (Jerusalem Post, October 6, 2024)

Scoop: U.S. wants to use Hezbollah's weakness to elect new Lebanese president (Barak Ravid, Axios, October 4, 2024)

Israel and U.S. repel 180-missile attack from Iran (Barak Ravid, Axios, Oct 1, 2024)

IDF: Hezbollah was ready to invade en masse after Oct. 7, we covertly raided 1,000 sites (Emanuel Fabian, Michael Bachner, The Times of Israel, Oct 1, 2024)

U.S., France and key allies call for a 21-day ceasefire in Lebanon (Barak Ravid, Axios, Sept 30, 2024)

Lebanese PM says willing to deploy army south of Litani River, fully implement UN resolution (Reuters Staff, Toi Staff, Times of Israel, Sept 30, 2024)

Smoke and ruins: A look at the wreckage at the site of Nasrallah’s assassination (Agencies and TOI Staff, The Times of Israel, Sept 29, 2024)

Plagues, War Criminals, and Palestinian Authority Views of the United States (Elliott Abrams, CFR, Sept 10, 2024)

Palestine and Jordan (Elliott Abrams, CFR, July 27, 2024)

U.S. Diplomacy in the Middle East: "Can't Anybody Here Play This Game?" (Elliott Abrams, CFR, July 9, 2024)

Visiting Israel, June 2024 (Elliott Abrams, CFR, July 1, 2024)

The Two-State Delusion (Elliott Abrams, Tablet Magazine, Feb 1, 2024)

War, Legitimacy and Context in the Middle East (Geoffrey Corn and David A. Deptula, Cipher Brief, August 19, 2024)

On The Ground In Gaza: What I Saw Of Israel’s Military Operations (David A. Deptula, Forbes, July 31, 2024)

The Gulf’s New Regional Vision Makes Room for Israel (Eyal, Hulata, Natalie Ecanow, The National Interest, April 14, 2024)

The gap between public declarations and actions is large. Prioritization is required. (Eyal Hulata, FDD, Nov 1, 2023)

Why Did Hamas Go All-In? (Eyal Hulata, FDD, Oct 12, 2023)

How Hamas Is Trying to Shape the “Day After” in Gaza (Ehud Yaari, WINEP, June 13, 2024)

Biden announces Israel has offered a three-part proposal to end the war in Gaza (Rebecca Shabad, Alexandra Marquez, NBC, May 31, 2024)

From crisis to prosperity: Netanyahu's vision for Gaza 2035 revealed online (Yuval Barnea, The Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2024)

The Day After: Action Plan (JINSA, March 5, 2024)

Trump and Harris Have No Plans for a World on Fire (Hal Brands, Bloomberg Opinion, Sept 22, 2024)

Hamas Is Weakened, But a Prolonged Guerrilla Conflict Looms (Ido Levy, WINEP, Sept 12, 2024)

Israel’s War of Regime Change Is Repeating America’s Mistakes (David Petraeus, Meghan O’Sullivan, Richard Fontaine, Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2024)

ELNET Delegation of Senior Defense Officials Visits Israel (Elnet, Sept 11, 2024)

I fought in Iraq — I know Israel’s doing all it can to save civilians (General Sir John McColl, Sept 11, 2024)

Israel Has Created a New Standard for Urban Warfare. Why Will No One Admit It? (John Spencer, Newsweek, Mar 25, 2024)